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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 January 1964

## MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Allan Evans, State (INR)

[redacted] USAF (DIA)

Lt. Colonel J. R. Voseipka, USA (ACSI)

Captain A. W. Long, USN (ONI)

Lt. Colonel R. D. Day, USAF (AFNIEBB)

[redacted] USAF, Chief,

Policy Staff, NSA

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## SUBJECT:

SNIE 14.3-64: NORTH VIETNAM

1. The importance of North Vietnam to the course of the war in South Vietnam has increased sufficiently of late, in our view, to justify an SNIE on North Vietnamese strengths and weaknesses at an early date. We accordingly propose that an SNIE be prepared for USIB consideration on Wednesday, 12 February 1964.

2. The last estimate on North Vietnam, SNIE 14.3-63, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and its Policies," dated 26 June 1963, did not discuss North Vietnam's strengths and weaknesses as such; the last estimate to do so was NIE 14.3/53-61, "Prospects for North and South Vietnam," dated 14 August 1961. We suggest that written contributions be prepared for this SNIE. In lieu of formal terms of reference, we are attaching a statement of the principal questions which we feel should be considered.

3. We request that your representatives meet with us to discuss these questions at 1400, Tuesday, 7 January, at CIA Headquarters.

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[redacted]  
Executive Officer  
National Estimates

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

3 January 1964

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SNIE 14.3-64: NORTH VIETNAM

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The DRV's principal political strengths and vulnerabilities.
  - a. How significant are divisions between the DRV regime and the populace? Among what segments of the populace is greatest dissatisfaction now found? Is there now any active dissidence in North Vietnam? Where? Under what conditions might active dissidence develop?
  - b. Are there significant divisions within DRV leadership? Over what issues or problems are these divisions primarily engendered?
2. Principal economic strengths and vulnerabilities.
  - a. What are North Vietnam's principal economic problems? How are they affected by DRV efforts in

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South Vietnam and Laos? What greater levels of effort could the DRV's economy support?

- b. How dependent is the DRV on foreign economic assistance? How much and what kind of aid is now being received (specify by donor)? Is Hanoi likely to become economically dependent upon Communist China? What would be the political implications of such economic dependence?
  - c. What are the chief economic vulnerabilities? How susceptible is the economy to sabotage?
3. Principal North Vietnamese military strengths and weaknesses.
  4. What are North Vietnam's general intentions towards the situation in South Vietnam and Laos. How would Hanoi be likely to react to various general circumstances (e.g., collapse of the Neutralist-Rightist coalition in Laos, radical improvement -- or deterioration -- in the Viet Cong's position in South Vietnam)?
  5. What is Hanoi's attitude towards Communist China and the USSR? How is the Sino-Soviet quarrel likely to affect the diplomatic and military help the DRV can expect from Communist China or the USSR? How is this quarrel likely to effect the policy lines Peiping or Moscow might urge on Hanoi?

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